Issued by Ismail Joosub on behalf of the FW de Klerk Foundation on 19/11/2025

Introduction
The Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (“IDAC”), housed within the National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”), represents South Africa’s principal prosecutorial-led response to high-level, complex corruption. Established amid the fallout from systemic “state-capture” and public outrage over abuse of state institutions, IDAC was tasked with converting investigative revelations into criminal accountability. But we must ask: what circumstances led to its creation, what does its legal mandate entail, how effective has it been – and what lessons can be drawn from comparable international anti-corruption bodies to strengthen its impact?

Establishment and Context of IDAC’s Creation
IDAC traces its origin to the creation of the predecessor unit known as the Investigating Directorate (“ID”), announced in April 2019. That announcement followed mounting evidence from the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (commonly known as the Zondo Commission, 2018-2021) of systemic graft in government and state-owned enterprises. Under Proclamation No. 20 of 2019, President Cyril Ramaphosa invoked section 7(1) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act of 1998 to establish the ID for an initial two-year lifespan, designed to prosecute those state-capture leads.

Over time, it became clear the temporary arrangement was insufficient. In August 2024, via the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act of 2024, IDAC was formally established as a permanent unit within the NPA, with enhanced powers including investigative/ police-type authority and the ability to recruit its own investigators and forensic specialists. This legislative upgrade marked a pivotal shift: from time-bound initiative to standing anti-corruption directorate, signalling a stronger institutional footing in South Africa’s justice architecture.

Mandate and Legal Framework
IDAC’s mandate is to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute serious, high-profile or complex corruption and related financial crimes – especially those emerging from commissions of inquiry or referred by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (“NDPP”). The legal basis lies in chapter 5 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act of 1998 (and subsequent regulations) which grant the Director investigating powers, such as subpoenaing witnesses and documents, executing search warrants and compelling testimony under oath (subject to use immunity) for “specified offences”.

With the 2024 amendments, IDAC gains policing-style powers akin to those of law enforcement agencies: it can recruit investigators and law enforcement personnel, aligning investigation and prosecution within a single unit. Organisationally, IDAC remains part of the NPA – reporting to the NDPP, not a stand-alone constitutional body ( such as chapter 9 institution). That placement has triggered debate regarding its structural independence and insulation from executive influence.

Performance and Achievements
Since inception, IDAC has, indeed, made some measurable strides. By mid-2024, the NPA reported that some R10,6 billion in assets were under restraint or preservation orders in state-capture cases and settlements, such as the R2,55 billion from the Swiss firm ABB had been achieved. The 2023/24 Annual Report further documents key achievements under the Investigating Directorate’s heading and shows efforts to build capacity in digital forensics and to improve multi-agency cooperation.

IDAC has taken on numerous high-profile matters – handling referrals from commissions, pursuing senior public officials and corporate actors, thereby signalling that no one is beyond scrutiny. Its creation has enabled a prosecutorial pipeline to convert inquiry findings into investigations – an essential link in accountability.
However, despite the docket build-up, measurable outcomes remain modest by public expectations. According to a recent assessment by Freedom House, enforcement remains “historically inadequate” and high-profile prosecutions are ongoing, but slow. Critics note that convictions of the highest tier of perpetrators remain elusive and case delays, withdrawals and administrative challenges persist.

Challenges and Constraints
IDAC’s effectiveness is constrained by several interlocking factors. First, capacity remains limited: although permanent recruitment is under way, the unit still operates with fewer resources than would match the scale of corruption it faces. Analyses point to under-funding, lack of specialised forensic and investigative personnel and reliance on secondments in the earlier phase.

Second, procedural complexity in high-level corruption matters – hundreds of millions or billions of rands, multiple accused, cross-border flows – means long investigative timelines, aggressive defence tactics and frequent delays. Indictments may be set aside or delayed on technical grounds, as seen in certain state-capture-linked matters. Third, structural independence remains contested: Some entities argue that IDAC’s placement in the NPA fails the independence standard required by the Glenister II judgment of the Constitutional Court (2011) for anti-corruption machinery free from executive control. Fourth, IDAC is vulnerable to coordination and information-access bottlenecks (for example delays in gaining access to the Zondo Commission data repository). Overall, the “marathon not sprint” nature of investigative prosecution means that public perceptions of inaction or slow progress can undermine the institution’s credibility.

Comparative Analysis with International Anticorruption Bodies
To contextualise IDAC, it is useful to compare its structure and performance with prominent international anti-corruption agencies. In Hong Kong, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (“ICAC”) was established in 1974 with a clear mandate, operational independence (reporting directly to the Governor), strong staffing and funding and a three-pronged approach of (i) enforcement, (ii) prevention, (iii) education. ICAC rapidly broke the back of institutional corruption and remains a benchmark. The lessons: independence, scale, civil-society support and prevention alongside prosecution.

In Romania, on the other hand, the National Anticorruption Directorate (“DNA”) is structurally located within the prosecution service (similar to IDAC), but was staffed with hundreds of prosecutors and several hundred investigators/police officers and secured hundreds of convictions of high-level officials within a decade. The Romanian example shows that even within a prosecutorial model, success is feasible given autonomy, resources and political backing.

By comparison, South Africa’s IDAC occupies a middle ground: it has more independence and dedicated mandate than ordinary prosecution units, yet less autonomy than a stand-alone commission. Its staff and resources remain far smaller than those of global exemplars and it remains early in its operational lifecycle. That said, it aligns with international norms of having a specialised anti-corruption unit under the state’s criminal-justice system; but to emulate the best performers it must scale up, strengthen independence and embed prevention alongside enforcement.

Conclusion
IDAC embodies a critical institutional step in South Africa’s fight against grand corruption. Born out of the state-capture era, its mandate to convert investigation into prosecution addresses a painful accountability gap. It has legal footing, enhanced powers and has begun to generate sign-posting outcomes: large-scale asset restraints, multi-accused dockets, high-profile referrals. Yet, the return on investment is still emerging: the lack of swift high-profile convictions, capacity constraints, procedural delays and structural independence questions limit its full potential.

Going forward, to realise its promise IDAC must be resourced commensurately, its independence further insulated and its operations streamlined (including faster trial adjudication and improved information access). International comparisons show that success is possible – but only when political will, institutional design and resources align. In South Africa’s context, the foundational work is under way; the next phase must translate that into visible, credible and timely accountability. IDAC’s story is still unfolding and its ultimate impact will depend as much on the system that supports it as on the unit itself.