Introduction

The Constitution requires the creation of an independent body to investigate complaints of police misconduct or offences. This body is the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (“IPID”).

Late last year, IPID invited public comments on its Draft Independent Police Investigative Directorate Regulations, 2025. The FW de Klerk Foundation responded with a submission highlighting concerns about IPID’s independence relating to the security of tenure, security of remuneration, as well as oversight and accountability mechanisms.

Why IPID’s Independence Matters

The Supreme Court of Appeal has stated that IPID requires sufficient or adequate independence to fulfil its mandate. The elements of sufficient or adequate independence are: Security of tenure and security of remuneration, as well as mechanisms for accountability and oversight that do not undermine autonomy, but are still subject  to appropriate political accountability.

Without these elements, IPID staff cannot perform their duties independently and vigorously.

What are the Concerns with the Draft Regulations?

The FW de Klerk Foundation has the following concerns that call for an amendment of the draft regulations:

Security of tenure:

Draft Regulation 7(6)(a) proposes allowing IPID investigators to be dismissed for “redundancy”. The Foundation argues that this erodes independence. If investigators can be removed simply, because their posts are “redundant”, they lack the protection to act boldly.

Importantly, the Foundations states that while generic public‑service standards may allow for dismissal because of redundancy, IPID’s independence requires heightened protection. E.g. The Constitutional Court had previously concluded that a similar weakness left the Hawks insufficiently independent.

Security of remuneration

Independence also hinges on financial security. Draft Regulation 5 sets out the salary levels for investigators, but not for IPID’s Executive Director. Instead, the Executive Director’s salary level is determined by the Police Minister with the Finance Minister’s agreement.

The Foundation points out that for IPID to be independent its leadership must be financially insulated from Executive leverage. Because the Executive Director’s remuneration is not statutorily secured, but simply determined by politicians, it is at  risk of political influence. Again, because the Hawks faced a similar problem the Constitutional Court said that they were insufficiently independent.

Oversight and accountability mechanisms

By permitting redundancy and leaving the Executive Director’s salary to political discretion, the Draft Regulations create pressure points through which political influence could penetrate IPID. If the Executive Director were compromised, these vulnerabilities could be exploited to weaken IPID and manipulate its work.

Conclusion

The public’s confidence in SAPS depends on IPID’s independence. However, because IPID investigators do not have security of tenure and IPID’s Executive Director’s salary is determined by politicians, the public would view IPID as being vulnerable to both external pressure and internal manipulation.

The Foundation, therefore, calls on IPID to amend the draft regulations by removing “redundancy” as a ground for dismissal and by fixing the Executive Director’s salary in law to shield it from political influence. These measures are essential to safeguard IPID’s independence and uphold the constitutional promise of impartial oversight.