ADDRESS BY F W DE KLERK TO THE TSWALU DIALOGUE ON ‘AFRICA’S BIG STATES’

TSWALU, BOTSWANA,  2 MAY 2003

 

 

‘THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPROMISE IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS’

 

 

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen

 

It is a great honour for me to be able to address you this evening.

 

One of the most important contributions that we in South Africa can make to the rest of Africa and to the international community is to show that even the most bitter, complex and intractable problems can be solved peacefully, through compramise and through negotiations.

 

Naturally, every conflict situation is different.  Each one has its own history and complexities and will require its own solution.

 

Accordingly, I would not presume to suggest that our experience in South Africa will necessarily or automatically be applicable to the conflicts elsewhere in Africa and the world.   I will, however, be happy to share with you some of our  experiences during our own process of transformation.   I will leave it to you to decide what is, or is not, relevant to other conflict situations.

 

Fourteen years ago South Africa was caught in the grip of a seemingly irresolvable conflict.  Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine parties that were further apart than the National Party, the IFP and the ANC.   All of the parties involved saw one another – not as they really were – but as the stereotypes depicted by their own propaganda:

 

• The ANC/SACP Alliance came from a radical socialist tradition. Before 1990 it was committed to nationalisation and the immediate introduction of an egalitarian society. It advocated a strong central government and state intervention in the economy to achieve its social purposes.  It insisted that the new Constitution should be drafted by an elected constituent assembly.  It viewed the National Party in terms of its experience of apartheid and of security force repression during the liberation struggle.

 

• The National Party, on other hand, strongly favoured a free enterprise economy, a federal state, and some form of power-sharing.  It believed that the new Constitution should be drafted before the first election.  Its views of the ANC had been formed during decades of struggle against the organisation and by its alliance with the South African Communist Party.

 

• The IFP, the third major party, had chosen to combat apartheid from within the system. For this reason it was distrusted by the ANC with whom it had for some time been waging a low intensity war in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.  It was strongly federalist; it supported free market principles and had its main support base among the Zulus of Natal.  It also believed very strongly that the new constitution should be drawn up by all the significant parties in the country before the first election.

 

What  enabled these parties and the other twenty-three that joined them in the  multi-party negotiations to bridge the enormous chasms that divided them?  I should like to suggest the following.  There was common acceptance that:

• whether we liked one another or not, there could be no long-term solution that did not involve all the major parties and population groups of our country.
• our problems could be solved only through negotiation – that any attempt by any party to continue to impose its will on its opponents by force would simply lead to the destruction of the country and the economy.
• we would have to put the bitterness of the past behind us and that we would have to search for genuine national reconciliation.
• we needed a strong Constitution that would provide the basic rules for our new society; that would guarantee the rights and security of all our individuals and communities.
• above all, we realised that a successful outcome to our negotiations would often require  genuine concessions and  painful compromises.

 

There were also certain objective circumstances that had created a window of opportunity for us:

• the collapse of global communism in 1989 removed the major strategic concern that had dominated the thinking of the previous government for decades. For us, the prospect of Soviet expansionism was not just an empty propaganda exercise.  During the previous years our armed forces had been involved in serious military clashes with Soviet and Cuban led forces in Angola.  The ANC /Alliance was closely allied to – and supported by – the global Soviet strategic apparatus.
• There was no longer any serious debate with regard to the economic policies that would be required to ensure economic growth in a future democratic South Africa. The devastation that central planning and statist controls had wrought on the economies of Eastern Europe was there for all to see.
• Throughout the negotiation process, all sides received strong encouragement from the international community to persevere in their difficult attempts to reach peaceful accommodation.  There was a sense of reassurance in the willingness of major powers to underwrite the democratic agreements that were to emerge from the negotiating process.

 

It was factors such as these that enabled us, in December 1993, to reach basic agreement on our new Transitional Constitution, despite the numerous crises, boycotts and walk-outs that we experienced during the process.   The key compromises that lead to our agreement are now a matter of record:

• Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a settlement was the ANC’s insistence that the new constitution should be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly that would be elected on a one-man, one-vote basis. The NP and the IFP strongly opposed this approach because it would deprive them – as minority parties – of their ability to ensure that key rights and provisions would be included in the new constitution.  We overcame this obstacle by accepting an ingenious compromise:  the negotiating parties would first reach agreement on a Transitional Constitution in terms of which a new parliament would be elected.  The new parliament, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, would then write our final Constitution.  The final Constitution would, in turn, have to be adopted by a two thirds majority  and would have to comply with thirty-four immutable constitutional principles that would already be included in the Transitional Constitution.
• We accepted that all our cultural groups – many of them nations in their own right – would be enabled to maintain their cultural identities within a new, broader South African nation. They would have the right – where practicable – to mother tongue education;  they would be able to practise their cultures and to speak their languages.
• After much debate, all parties accepted reasonable provisions for the protection of property rights and, in particular, the principle that no-one could be deprived of property without fair and market-related compensation
• We agreed that for the first five years after the election there would be a Government of National Unity, which would include all parties that received more than five percent of the vote.
• We agreed that South Africa would henceforth include nine provinces with substantial powers of their own.
• We agreed that all those, from all sides, who might have committed politically motivated offences during the period of our national  conflict before 6 December 1993 would  have a  right to amnesty.

 

The result of this process was the  adoption in December 1993 of our new Transitional Constitution.  It made provision for a fully democratic system of government based on the rule of law, with  guarantees for the full range of human and civil rights.

 

Looking back on our experience we can identify the following key factors that contributed to the success of our negotiations:

• There must be a genuine commitment to a negotiated solution by all the main parties. The balance of forces must be such that no party should think that it can successfully impose its will on the others.  Perceptions of relative power – and projections of future shifts in the balance of power – are crucial.   It is such perceptions that will often determine the form that compromises will take and the demands and concessions that parties will make at the negotiating table.   In short, if a party has no power and few prospects it is unlikely that other parties will feel much need to make compromises to accommodate its interests.
• It is essential for negotiators to win one another’s trust and confidence. Without trust there can be no genuine agreement.
• Timing is crucial. Had we started our negotiation initiative earlier – say, in the middle ‘seventies – it

is doubtful that the National Party government would have been able to take its followers with it.   If we had launched our initiative too late, we might have entered the negotiation process when the balance of power had begun to shift against us – as Ian Smith did in Zimbabwe.

 

History sometimes opens a window of opportunity, when all the forces involved are ripe for negotiation.  It is the task of statesmen to recognise such windows and lead their followers through, before history once again slams the window shut.

• Negotiations that do not involve all the parties are like rugby matches in which one of the teams fails to appear.  One of the major problems that we encountered were the boycotts of the talks that were initiated first by the ANC and then by the IFP.    It was essential for us to persuade all the major parties to rejoin the process before the elections.  This we ultimately managed to do with only eight days to spare!  It is equally important for parties to be able to take their constituencies with them.  Strong and determined leadership is essential.  An important, but time -consuming – factor in our negotiations  was the lengthy process for participants to consult their constituencies before important decisions.
• Personalities also play an important role. The main role players from the negotiating parties must be able to develop personal relationships based on mutual trust and confidence.  They must also develop a strong sense of patience and the fortitude to deal with the frequent frustrations and obstacles.
• In our negotiations at Kempton Park we found it very useful to develop special mechanisms to deal with deadlocks and problems.  One such mechanism was a two-man committee of senior officials, whose task it was to suggest compromises and solutions when deadlocks and problems arose.
• Ultimately, negotiators must be prepared to take risks to assure a successful outcome to their efforts.  Few agreements will ever be absolutely water-tight and at some juncture a leap of faith will usually be unavoidable.
• Win/win outcomes. Ultimately, the success of negotiations will depend on the ability of the negotiators to fashion workable compromises by addressing the reasonable interests and concerns of all parties.   One-sided solutions seldom last and simply make the eventual  resumption of genuine negotiations more difficult.

 

These are among the factors and processes that enabled South Africa to reach agreement on our peaceful transition to multi-racial democracy.   The fruits of our successful compromise have been well worth the effort, sacrifices and frustrations involved in negotiations.  The price of continued conflict would have been bitter and unacceptable.

 

The best contribution that we in South Africa can make will be to work day and night for the continued success of our own peaceful transition.   We must continue to show the world that there is another way,  that violence and conflict are not inevitable,  that there is a peaceful solution to even the most complex problems and disputes.